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C A U S E S  A S  E X P L A N A T I O N S :  A C R I T I Q U E *  
Causes certainly are connected with effects; but 
this is because our theories connect them, not 
because the world is held together by cosmic 
glue. 1 
Norwood Russell Hanson 
ABSTRACT. This paper offers a critique of the view that causation can be analyzed in 
terms of explanation. In particular, the following points are argued: (1) a genuine 
explanatory analysis of causation must make use of a fully epistemological-psychological 
notion of explanation; (2) it is unlikely that the relatively clear-cut structure of the 
causal relation can be captured by the relatively unstructured relation of explanation; 
(3) the explanatory relation does not always parallel the direction of causation; (4) 
certain difficulties arise for any attempt to construct a nonrelativistic relation of caus- 
ation from the essentially relativistic relation of explanation; and (5) to analyze causation 
as explanation is to embrace a form of "causal idealism", the view that causal connec- 
tions are not among the objective features of the world. The paper closes with a brief 
discussion of the contrast between the two fundamentally opposed viewpoints about 
causality, namely causal idealism and causal realism. 
It is little more  than  a t ruism to  say that  causes explain  their  effects ,  or tha t  
to ask for  the cause o f  an event  is to  ask for  an exp lana t ion  o f  why  or h o w  
the event  occurred .  This close associat ion be tween  causat ion and exp lana t ion  
is amply  mi r ro red  in language: we answer 'why ' -ques t ions  wi th  'becuase ' -  
s t a t emen t s ,  and surely there  is more  than an or thographic  resemblance  
be tw een  'cause '  and 'because ' .  The associat ion is also ancient :  it  goes back to 
Aris to t le ,  w h o  charac ter ized  true,  scientif ic knowledge  as knowledge  o f  the 
' w h y '  o f  things,  tha t  is, knowledge  o f  the cause tha t  makes  a thing wha t  it 
is and no t  some th ing  else. 2 More recent ly  Hanson wro te :  3 
The primary reason for referring to the cause of x is to explain x. There are as many 
causes of x as there are explanations of x. 
Thus the c o n n e c t i o n  be tween  causes and exp lana t ions  seems more  than a 
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contingent matter; it strikes us as being rooted in the very concepts of cause 
and explanation. It becomes attractive, therefore, to attempt an explicit 
analysis of causation as explanation. If there is a single characteristic that binds 
together the diverse range of things we commonly identify as 'causes', it seems 
to be that they explain their effects, that is, they can serve in an account of 
the existence and properties of whatever it is they are said to be causes of. 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that, apart from some scattered 
exceptions to be mentioned below, no sustained effort has been made to 
formulate a systematic and detailed analysis of causal concepts in terms of 
explanatory concepts. Nor has there been a systematic exploration of the 
precise nature of the connection between causes and explanations. That 
there are some intimate connections is often simply assumed or asserted; 
but these connections have never been catalogued or elucidated. The present 
paper has the modest aim of examining some issues involved in the program 
of analyzing causation as explanation. More specifically, I intend to examine 
and comment on a recent explanatory analysis of causation, and then to 
develop some larger issues and problems that seem to arise for any genuine 
explanatory analysis of causal relations. If I am right in my major conclu- 
sions, the project of analyzing causes as explanations not only runs into a 
variety of difficulties in its execution, but it also forces upon us a choice 
between two fundamentally opposed viewpoints with regard to the place 
of the causal relation in the world and the role it plays in our knowledge 
of the world, that is, between 'causal realism' and 'causal idealism'. I shall 
claim that to view causation merely as explanation is to embrace a form of 
causal idealism, a viewpoint I believe we should reject. 
It will be useful to focus our discussion on some recent proposals made by 
Scriven toward an analysis of causation as explanation. These proposals are 
not always easy to interpret consistently; this is in part because they are 
bound up with Scriven's attempts to refute the traditional regularity account 
of causality, and in part because Scriven at the same time holds the view that 
causation cannot be analyzed. All the same Scriven's account of causation as 
explanation can serve as a framework within which we could develop a 
general critique of the explanatory approach to causality. Scriven writes:4 
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Now suppose we assert that requests for the cause of something are like requests for 
directions or guidance (What should I do now?). More specifically, they are requests for 
single-factor explanations (of a certain kind). 
The correlative grammar of other causal concepts would then go s•mething like this. 
A cause is an explanatory factor (of a particular kind). Causation is the relation between 
explanatory factors (of this kind) and what they explain. 
Scriven goes to explain 'explanation':S 
We can amplify the concept of explanation on which this depends by saying, crudely 
speaking, that (i) explanations are symbolic vehicles for conveying understanding; (ii) 
understanding is acquired whenever the capacity for solving a certain appropriate range 
of problems is achieved without learning the solutions for each problem separately; (iii) 
understanding may thus be acquired by all sorts of input, scientific or not, depending 
simply on whether they produce this result; and (iv) the determination of the "appro- 
priate range of problems" is a contextual requirement. 
I believe Scriven will be the first to admit that the proposals he makes here 
are only a skeleton of  a theory, and that detailed work remains to be done to 
convert this skeleton into a full-fledged analysis. However, exactly how the 
details are worked out is not  our present concern. Our purpose is not  to 
produce specific counterexamples to a particular explanatory account of  
causation, but rather to evaluate the general approach embodied in Scriven's 
discussion. For this reason, it is best not  to worry about the qualification 
'o f  a certain kind' or 'of  a particular kind'  in Scriven's thesis that a cause is 
an explantory factor of  a certain ta'nd. Ultimately one would need to ask 
whether the kind in question can be characterized in a noncircular way, but 
at this point our attention should be directed to the central core of  the 
thesis that causes are explanations.  
What is of  crucial importance is Scriven's account, sketchy as it is, of  
explanation in terms of  'understanding'. This is important because the mere 
assertion that causes are explanations does not commit one to any specific 
theory o f  causation unless the concept of  explanation involved is made clear. 
It is not  required that a full and complete theory of  explanation be given; 
what we need is, at a minimum, an indication of  the direction in which one 
wishes to go in explaining 'explanation'. The reason for this is simple: if 
by 'explanation' one has in mind something like Hempelian deductive- 
nomological (D-N) arguments, then the explanatory analysis of  causation 
would quickly collapse to the standard nomological or regularity analysis. 
Thus, Hempel's own remarks about causes, which tie singular causal 
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statements to D-N explanations, cannot be considered as forming even the 
beginning of a genuine explanatory theory of causation; 6 in fact, Hempel 
may be viewed as having attempted a reduction of both explanation and 
causation to nomological connections between events, and on his essentially 
Humean regularity view of lawlikeness, nomological connections themselves 
reduce to the Humean relation of 'constant conjunction'. 
As is evident in the second of the two passages quoted from Scriven 
above, the D-N model is the furthest thing in Scriven's mind when he talks 
about explanation. This passage has the virtue of bringing out dearly his 
commitment to an explicitly psychological and episternological view of 
explanation, and this is what makes his account interesting: it is what makes 
the account a genuine explanatory theory of causation. Any genuine account 
of causation as explanation should make use of the full-blooded notion of 
explanation with all its epistemological and psychological implications and 
associations. I do not claim that explanation is merely a psychological affair, 
but it is difficult to see how a full account of explanation could avoid refer- 
ence to such epistemological and quasi-psychological notions as 'under- 
standing', 'making intelligible', 'puzzle', 'knowledge', etc. It is likely that 
there is always some 'cognitive' or 'theoretical content' in any explanation, 
and this content may just be a D-N argument. But, then, as we have seen, an 
account of causation as explanation in this sense of 'cognitive content' may 
simply turn out to be the standard Humean account. Although this is in a 
sense a terminological point, it is important nonetheless; for our aim is to 
discuss genuine explanatory theories of causality, not some disguised regu- 
larity account; our aim is to bring out the strengths and weaknesses of the 
explanatory analysis insofar as it is a distinctive approach to causality in its 
own right. 
The point being emphasized here can be appreciated when we look at the 
ambiguous nature of the account of singular causal statements offered by 
Morton White, who advocates the following thesis: 7 
A statement of the form 'A is a contributory cause of C' is true if and only if there is 
an explanatory deductive argument containing 'A' as a premise and 'C' as its conclusion. 
"Hae critical expression in this formulation is 'explanatory deductive argu- 
ment'. According to White, who is basically sympathetic with the Hempelian 
nomological account of explanation, there is an important difference between 
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a mere law and an explanatoo~ law. The motivation for this distinction is 
twofold: first, the apparent fact, noted by White, that some perfectly legiti- 
mate D-N arguments fail to be explanatory, and second, White's belief that 
this is due to the use of a nonexplanatory law, a 'mere law', in the explanans 
of the argument. An example of such a nonexplanatory law offered by White 
is "Whenever there is lightning, there is thunder very soon afterwards". 8 It 
isn't entirely clear whether this particular statement is a law or whether no 
D-N argument making use of this statement is explanatory, but this is 
unimportant. The point to be noted is that in the absence of further explana- 
tion of the concept of 'explanatory law' it is not possible to categorize 
White's analysis either as an explanatory or as a nonexplanatory account. 
White himself says little by way of explicating this concept, but there are 
a few things he says that are of interest. First, he thinks that whether a law 
is explanatory is not a matter of 'judgment'. Being a matter of judgment, 
I would suppose, is somewhat like being 'subjective', a situation in which no 
objective criteria exist as to being correct or incorrect about the matter 
involved. Second, White says that the concept of an explanatory law could 
be 'relative in character', that is, it is a covert relation that is fully expressible 
by the locution 'explanatory law for person or culture X'.  9 Thus, the concept 
of explanation White has in mind could be relative though not subjective. 
(We shall recur to this matter of relativity later.) In any event it is clear that 
pending further clarification of the notion of 'explanatory law', and hence 
of the notion of 'explanation', White's theory of causal statements cannot 
be definitively classified. 
Hanson, too, has closely associated causation with explanation. While 
Hanson does not offer a systematically developed and articulated account 
of explanation, his conception of explanation evidently goes much beyond 
the standard D-N account in taking the epistemological and conceptual 
aspects of our explanatory endeavors as central to successful scientific theo- 
rizing. Hanson's views do not lend themselves to a short encapsulation, but 
some of the highlights can be mentioned. 1~ According to Hanson, cause- 
words, such as 'wound' (as contrasted with 'scar'), explain because they 
are 'theory-laden'; they derive their explanatory power from the interlocking 
patterns of concepts in which they enter as part of a scientific theory, and a 
theory is explanatory because it provides a multi-layered system of concepts, 
the layers corresponding, to the different degrees of explanatory power 
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attaching to these concepts. And a theory, for Hanson, is not a mere abstract 
calculus that is given a 'partial interpretation' in observation by 'corre- 
spondence rules'. The foremost goal of a scientific theory is to explain 
observed phenomena and Hanson would say that the positivist conception 
of theories as partially interpreted formal systems is incapable of accounting 
for this central aspect of theories. Hanson emphasizes conceptual congruence 
between cause and effect (no mere Humean constant conjunctions will pro- 
vide such connections), and also the context-dependency of explanation. 
Regardless of the question of detail, it should be clear that Hanson's explana- 
tory account of causation does not reduce to any sort of regularity account; 
Hanson takes the epistemological aspects of explanation as essential, and it is 
the use of these epistemological factors that makes an approach to causation 
a genuine explanatory approach. 
Let us now turn to some details of Scriven's proposals. This will help us 
uncover some fundamental problems that any explanatory theory of causation 
would have to face. According to Scriven, A is a cause of B just in case A is 
an explanatory factor (of a certain kind) for B. Scriven amplifies this by 
adding that an explanation is a conventional vehicle of communicating 
'understanding', and that understanding is acquired when the capacity for 
solving a class of problems is obtained. Throughout his discussion Scriven 
repeatedly stresses the context dependency of the notion of understanding 
and the marginal role played, if any at all, by the 'objective correlative' of 
a causal statement. What, according to Scriven, are the advantages to be 
gained from this explanatory analysis of causat.ion? 
(1) Scriven claims that this analysis explains why causation is irreflexive 
and transitive: 
It is obviously useless to provide information that the inquirer already has. One does 
not come to understand a phenomenon described by oneself as X by being told that 
it exists or that it is called X.. .  
If the phenomenon-to-be-explained (X) is explained by reference to another pheno- 
menon, P, and that phenomenon is explained by reference to a phenomenon A, then 
of course X has to be explained in terms of A (hence causation is, generally speaking, 
transitive).lt 
Few will question that causal relations are irreflexive and transitive; but are 
explanatory relations also irreflexive and intransitive? Take irreflexivity first. 
As Scriven says, it would be pointless to reply 'P '  when asked "Why is it 
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the case that P?".  But this isn't enough: to conclude that explanation is 
irreflexive one needs to show that we cannot explain X by reference to X 
(note Scriven's wording in the quotation above), and as long as the same X 
can be described in nonequivalent ways, self-explanation need not take the 
form '3( is so because X is so'. In this connection, William Dray's notion of 
explanation by redescription 12 readily comes to mind as a possible legitimate 
way of explaining something by reference to itself, i.e., by redescribing it. As 
examples of such a mode of explanation the following examples come to 
mind: we redescribe the scratchy lines on a photographic plate exposed in a 
Wilson cloud chamber as 'tracks of such-and-such particles colliding with 
such-and-such particles'; we redescribe a peasant unrest as 'the beginning of 
a revolution'. Now Scriven himself seems to leave open this sort of possibility 
when he talks of "the phenomenon to be explained and the necessarily 
different (at least in description) phenomena that provide the explanation"; 13 
and in comparison with, say, the D-N model, his broad and relatively un- 
structured conception of explanation should be particularly congenial to 
the possibility of explanation by redescription. In any case, the very possi- 
bility of this sort of explanation throws doubt on Scriven's claim that explan- 
ation, on his account, is irreflexive, and that hence so is causation. 
(2) As for the alleged transitivity of explanation similar difficulties arise. 
To be sure, a nonepistemic conception of explanation, such as the D-N 
account, may very well make explanation a transitive relation;even under an 
epistemic conception, the logical relation holding between the explanandum 
and the explanans ('the theoretical substance of the explanation') may very 
well be transitive. But it is by no means an obvious or trivial matter that explan- 
ation understood in its full-fledged epistemic and psychological sense is transi- 
tive; in fact, it is doubtful that the explanatory relation as conceived by Scriven 
can be transitive. For from the fact (i) that reference to X would impart, to 
a suitably qualified person, understanding of Y, or a problem-solving capacity 
with regard to Y, and (ii) that reference to Y would do the same for a suit- 
ably qualified person with regard to Z, it by no means follows logically that 
reference to X would impart to such a person understanding or some problem- 
solving capacity with regard to Z. Perhaps, a 'suitably qualified person' could 
not see the connection between X and Z without actually going through the 
intermediate Y. The situation here is similar to this: entailment is transitive 
but knowledge of entailment may very well not be, and probably isn't. 
300 JAEGWON KIM 
(3) What the foregoing shows is that once epistemological and psycho- 
logical elements are brought into explanation, we can no longer count on 
the explanatory relation to exhibit neat and clear-cut structures such as 
transitivity and irreflexivity. Since the causal relation appears to be more 
clearly structured than the explanatory relation - at least, the causal relation 
must be transitive and irreflexive - there is prima facie doubt that the explan- 
atory relation could be made to mirror the structure of the causal relation. 
When we consider the question of asymmetry, the difficulty becomes evident. 
For a certain X and Y, there may be no good reason to think that the explan- 
atory relation could not obtain both ways, from X to Y, and from Y to X; 
this could clearly be the case for different persons, and it seems that we could 
imagine the situation obtaining for one person. That is, a person may under- 
stand X by reference to Y, and Y by reference to X; in fact, if X and Y are 
lawfully correlated so that each could be manipulated through the manipu- 
lation of the other, then under Scriven's account of understanding in terms 
of the acquisition of a problem solving capacity it seems perfectly possible for 
X and Y to explain each other. 
Now Scriven himself leaves open such a possibility when he says that "if  
X can be explained in terms of P, it's an open question whether the converse 
is true". 14 The problem, however, is that the causal relation is asymmetric: if 
X is the cause of Y, then Y can't be the cause of X. It will not do, as Scriven 
does, blithely to conclude that causation isn't asymmetric, because explan- 
ation isn't. Causation is generally thought to be asymmetric, and if a pro- 
posed analysis of causation doesn't make is asymmetric, an explanation of 
why causation isn't, or needn't be, asymmetric, should be provided. 
(4) Our discussion so far indicates that while there may be a close connec- 
tion between causation and explanation, the two may not always run in 
parallel directions, and this, I believe, is indeed the case. Consider these 
facts: 
(i) A full understanding of an event, or kind of event or process, may 
involve not only information concerning its causative factors but also infor- 
mation concerning its effects. Consider the problem of attaining a proper 
understanding of such events and processes as the Industrial Revolution, the 
gravitational collapse of a star, atomic fissions and fusions, and the early 
deprivation of a mother or mother-substitute for an infant. It would seem 
that in any ordinary sense of 'understanding', or Scriven's sense of it, a 
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full and proper understanding of these phenomena must attend to their 
effects, as well as to their causes. 
(ii) One pattern of explanation that has lately received a good deal of 
attention is the so-called 'teleological explanation' or 'functional analysis', 
a mode ol / explanation which some believe is prevalent in the biological 
and social sciences. :s There has been much controversy about the precise 
nature of explanations of this type, but it is safe to say that these explan- 
ations are typically, if not always, explanations of the presence or occurrence 
of a biological or sociological trait, process, or condition in terms of its 
causal e f fec t s  that are relevant to the occurrence or attainment of a certain 
'goal-state', such as the survival or maintenance of the organism or social 
group. Here causal and explanatory connections criss-cross each other, and 
if an overall pattern is discernible, it is that a typical teleological explanation 
of a phenomenon is a causal explanation in terms of the e f f ec t s  of the pheno- 
menon, not in terms of its causes. 
(iii) One important variety of theoretical explanation in science is micro- 
explanation of macro-phenomena; theoretical science abounds in such explan- 
ations (e.g., explanation of thermal phenomena in terms of kinetic molecular 
phenomena, molecular explanation of genetic phenomena, etc.). These 
explanations aren't noncausal  - at least, they needn't be - but it isn't happy 
to regard the micro-state as a cause of the macro-phenomenon it explains. 
For one thing it would obscure important differences between this model 
of reductive explanation and the more familiar causal explanation in which 
an event is explained by reference to temporally antecedent causal deter- 
minants; for another, some philosophers would regard the relation between 
the micro-processes and their macro-counterparts (e.g., molecular phenomena 
and thermal phenomena) as that of i den t i t y  ("Heat is nothing but molecular 
motion"), and to adopt the position that one is the cause of the other is to 
preclude, without argument, this interesting philosophical interpretation of 
the relation whereby micro-processes determine the nature of the macro- 
phenomena they underlie. 16 
We must conclude that there is no neat parallel relationship between 
causation and explanation. Compared with the rather clearly structured 
relation of causality, the explanatory relation is a free-wheeling aft'air;it can 
ride on the causal relation backward as well as forward, and sometimes it 
does not have a clear directional relationship at all with respect to causality. 
302 JAEGWON KIM 
If we take explanation in the broad sense of making some phenomenon 
intelligible, better understood, and so forth, then we should expect that 
knowledge of the whole causal network in which the phenomena is a link 
will be relevant. The usual preference for the causal origin of whatever it is 
that is the object of explanation may simply reflect our interest in the control 
and prediction of that sort of phenomenon. Of course, our concept of under- 
standing may be connected in certain important ways with control and 
prediction, but this is a point that needs further exploration. Scriven's own 
account of understanding in terms of problem-solving capacities is not 
definite enough to rule out understanding in terms of effects as a valid way 
of achieving understanding. 
II 
As Scriven and others have emphasized, what works as an explanation for one 
person, that is, what 'conveys understanding' to one person, may fail as an 
explanation for another person with different cognitive resources and capaci- 
ties, and with different queries or puzzles. Indeed, the so-called 'pragmatic' 
and 'context-dependent' character of explanation has often been stressed in 
the philosophical literature on explanation, and philosophers like Sylvain 
Bromberger and Peter Achinstein have done valuable work in delineating the 
epistemological and others kinds of factors that constitute the context of 
a given explanatory episode. ~7 There is no question that explanation, broadly 
understood, is a heavily context-dependent affair, and no full account of 
explanation could ignore this relativity of explanation with respect to con- 
textual factors. 
It will be premature to conclude, however, that any explanatory account 
of causation inevitably renders the causal relation a similarly relativistic 
relation. If something like "P is an explanation of Q for the person A in the 
context C" (where 'C' could be a conjunction of contextual factors) is the 
basic schematic expression for the explanatory relation, the explanatory 
theory of causation need not take as the basic expression of the causal 
relation the similarly relativized expression "P is a cause of Q for the person 
A in the context C". Causal relativism of this overt sort is surely intolerable. 
Now, in order to get a nonrelative causal expression from the relativized 
explanatory relation one of the following two procedures may be followed: 
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(1) we may choose some standard person A and standard context C, say A* 
and C* (the expression 'A*' and 'C*', therefore, are constants, not variables), 
and explain 'P causes Q' as 'P explains Q for A* in C*'; alternatively, (2) we 
may existentially quantify away the variables 'A' and 'C' and explain 'P 
causes Q' as "For some (possible?) person A in some (possible?) context C, 
P is an explanation of Q". Scriven himself hints at the first procedure when 
he says "the explanation is thus whatever would impart full understanding 
to a suitably qualified listener/reader". TM In fact, we may take Scriven's 
formulation as a hybrid of the two procedures picking a reference audience 
(a 'suitably qualified' audience) and existentially quantifying over the con- 
text C. 
It is easy to see, however, that neither of the two approaches yields 
satisfactory results. On the first approach, various questions arise for the 
choice of the reference standards. Scriven's notion of 'suitably qualified 
listener/reader' is itself heavily context-dependent and any choice of a 
definite reference standard will be subject to the challenge: "Why this stan- 
dard and not some other?" The possibility of such a challenge is not to be 
taken lightly, for the choice of reference standards is going to determine 
what causal relations are to hold in the world. It is dubious that any choice 
of reference standards could be justified, unless one is willing to embrace 
the view that causal relations after all are not objective characteristics of the 
world. For as long as we take the realist view of causality that causal con- 
nections are among the real facts of the world independent of our cognition, 
any choice of reference audience A and the context C would have to be 
justified by a demonstration that explanatory connections just for this 
audience in this sort of context constitute causal connections. It is difficult 
to see how such a justification could be successfully formulated. 
On the second approach mentioned above of existentially quantifying 
away audience and context, causal connections will multiply and proliferate 
beyond any reasonable bounds. For, given the variety of possible theoretical 
and conceptual puzzles, queries and predicaments and the diverse range of 
cognitive resources and capacities different persons could bring to an explan- 
atory context, the question what facts, events, etc. will explain what other is 
a wide-open question. As Achinstein observes, "given many E's and q's that 
to us seem quite unrelated, we can at least imagine an A and a situation S 
such that A would attempt to explain q to those in S by citing E",  19 and 
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many of these explanatory attempts might succeed. Indeed, the possibilities 
can be seen to be truly limitless when we realize that humans are not the 
only possible cognitive beings, and that there may well be other cognitive 
beings whose requirements for 'understanding' are entirely different from 
ours. On the explanatory account of causality, how could such possibilities 
be discounted? It would seem that the only way to discount them would be 
openly to adopt an anthropomorphic relativism with respect to causality, a 
position that would be repugnant to a realist and objectivist position on 
causation. We shall recur to this problem below. 
We now turn to another general problem with the explanatory account 
of causation which is not often recognized. The notion of understanding, 
hence the notion of explanation, clearly admit of degrees. We can speak of 
how well something is understood by some one, and similarly how well an 
explanation succeeds in explaining something. In fact, the degree to which 
an explanation is successful as an explanation can be measured using a variety 
of distinct, though related, criteria; Achinstein mentions relevance, correct- 
ness, depth, completeness, unification and manner of presentation, and all 
of these criteria permit graduated evaluations. 2~ On the other hand, what 
might it mean to attach degrees to causal relations? Or are there just the right 
degrees of these properties such than an explanation having them just to 
those degrees will yield a causal relation? It would seem that what needs to 
be done is for the advocate of the explanatory approach to show that dif- 
ferent explanations of the same phenomenon that do not rate equally on 
these criteria can, and often do, make references to the same explanatory 
facts or events. This, I do not believe, is a very difficult problem; it is, none- 
theless, a problem that should be dealt with by those who advocate the 
explanatory approach to causation. 
We now come to our final point, a point that I believe is of considerable 
philosophical interest and importance. It concerns two philosophical positions 
which could be called 'causal realism' and 'causal idealism' respectively. The 
two viewpoints I have in mind can be explained by reference to Hume, 
because Hume can be considered either as a causal realist or idealist depending 
on which of the two interpretations of Hume's views on causation is chosen. 
An historically accurate interpretation of Hume's theory is not our main 
concern; what is of interest is the fact that strands of both realism and 
idealism are clearly present in Hume. For, on the one hand, he refers to 
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causation (along the resemblance and contiguity) as "the cement of the 
universe" on which the "operations of the mind must in a great measure 
depend". 21 Hume qualifies these remarks by saying that causation is, ' to us', 
the cement of the universe, but  Hume's statement, if taken literally, suggests 
the view that causal connections are objectively real connections in the world 
that are independent,  in their existence and essential nature, of human 
cognition and belief. Whether or not there are humans, or indeed any other 
sorts of beings capable of cognition, rising temperatures would cause ice to 
melt, gravity would cause bodies to accelerate, and sunlight reflected from 
the surface of the earth would cause earthlight on the moon. At least, so 
thinks the causal realist. 
But there is another aspect of Hume's account of causation. Of the notion 
of causal necessity, Hume says, "Upon the whole, necessity is something that 
exists in the mind, not in objects, ''2z and goes on to give the following vivid 
description of a causal realist's reaction to his account of causal necessity. 23 
But though this be the only reasonable account we can give of necessity, the contrary 
notion is so riveted in the mind from the principles above-mentioned, that I doubt not 
but my sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. What! the 
efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind! As if causes did not operate 
entirely independent of the mind, and would not continue their operation, even though 
there was no mind existent to contemplate them, or reason concerning them. Thought 
may well depend on causes for its operation, but not causes on thought. This is to 
reverse the order of nature, and make that secondary, which is really primary. 
Hume's reply to this is essentially that it's no use to protest: :4 
I can only reply to all these arguments that the case here is much the same as if a blind 
man should pretend to find a great many absurdities in the supposition that the colour 
of scarlet is not the same with the sound of a trumpet, nor light the same with solidity. 
If we have really no idea of a power or efficacy in any object, or of any real connection 
betwixt causes and effects, it will be to little purpose to prove that an efficacy is nec- 
essary in all operations. 
The point of view Hume seems to hold in these passages is what I call 'causal 
idealism'. To be sure, Hume's target here is the idea of 'necessary connection' ,  
and perhaps not  that of  causal connection itself. But we can say this: on the 
interpretation of Hume according to which necessary connection is an essential 
ingredient in the concept of causation, Hume is a causal idealist. Causal connec- 
tions are the projections of our mind with no genuine objective correlates in 
the world; they are mere creatures of our belief, custom and association. 
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On the other hand, if we take Hume's position on causation as expressed 
in the famous statement "we may define a cause to be an object followed 
by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by 
objects similar to the second") 5 that is to say, if we take Hume's initial 
account of causation sans necessary connection, then we have a realist 
account of causation. For, presumably, the relations of temporal precedence, 
spatio-temporal contiguity and constant conjunction are objective relations 
in the world that are independent of the 'operations of the mind'. 
I hope that the outlines of the two fundamentally opposed viewpoints on 
causation that I have called 'causal realism' and 'causal idealism' have been 
made clear enough for our present purposes. Among the historical figures 
we can classify, I believe, Aristotle and Kant as causal realists; as we saw, 
Hume's allegiance to one or the other school will depend on the interpreta- 
tion of his doctrines; Mill is probably a causal realist. Some clear examples of 
causal idealists come from contemporary philosophy: Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus 26 (5.1361: "Belief in causal nexus is superstition"), Hanson 
(as the quotation from him at the beginning of the paper attests), and, by 
stretching things a bit, Goodman 27 (see his explication of lawlikeness in 
terms of 'entrenchment'). Contemporary positivists are generally Humeans 
and share Hume's ambivalent attitude toward causal efficacy (if causal 
efficacy is part of the causal relation, they would be causal idealists; if law- 
like constant conjunctions are sufficient for causal relations, they would be 
causal realists)) a Philosophers like Collingwood, yon Wright, and Gasking, 29 
who attempt to explain causation in terms of concepts pertaining to human 
actions, are best classified, I believe, as relativistic causal realists - relativistic 
because of the injection of human agency into causal relation. 
The point of bringing out all this is that I believe the explanatory approach 
to causation is a form of causal idealism. Explanation is essentially and 
primarily an epistemological concept; it has to do with 'understanding', 
'intelligibility', and integration and systematization of our beliefs and know- 
ledge about the world. To base the analysis of causation on the concept of 
explanation is to project an aspect of our knowledge ('the operations of the 
mind') onto the word.  Compare this with the kind of account a causal realist 
would give of the relation between causal relations and explanatory relations. 
A fundamental tenet of causal realism would be the claim that causal connec- 
tions are the objective correlates of explanatory relat ions-  at least, the 
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relations embodied in the so-called 'causal explanations'. Explanations serve 
to explain, and correct explanations are correct because they reflect the 
objectively existent determinative connections among events, states, and 
processes, just as our beliefs are correct because they 'correspond to'  objec- 
tive facts and conditions. To explain causation in terms of explanation 
would, on the realist view, be somewhat like basing an account of the concept 
of fact  on the concept of true belief. Explanations, as we noted earlier, are 
subject to evaluation on various criteria such as appropriateness and rele- 
vance, but what makes an explanation correct as an explanation is the fact 
that it mirrors what's out there independently of our cognition. The causal 
realist believes that trying to explain certain properties of the causal relation, 
such as transitivity and asymmetry, in terms of the (alleged) fact that the 
explanatory relation has these properties is going the wrong way. The right 
way is to explain why explanations have these properties (to the extent that 
they do) by reference to the corresponding properties of the causal relations. 
Where these properties break down for explanation we would need to refer 
to the specifically epistemological and psychological character of explanation. 
On the realistic view, the relation between explanation and causation is 
rather like the relation between seeing an object and the properties of the 
object, or that between true belief and fact. The idealist, too, could agree 
that these relations are rather similar, but he will say, for example, that the 
object perceived and its properties are mere logical constructions out of our 
'ideas'. 
This is not the place to give an extensive argument for causal realism but 
I wish to note a few points that would be relevant in assessing the compara- 
tive merits of the two opposing viewpoints. First, on the idealist view it 
would be difficult, I think, to give a plausible and defensible account of the 
'correctness' of  an explanation. Perhaps, the idealist would want to say that 
such a concept as 'correctness' has no application to explanation, but this in 
itself strikes me as an implausible view. I believe that the correctness or 
accuracy of an explanation has nothing logically to do with the success of 
an explanation in creating a sense of relief from puzzlement or 'intellectual 
satisfaction'. In any successful explanatory episode there must be some 
theoretical content conveyed that is 'correct' or 'accurate', and which can 
be judged to be so on an objective ground. Second, it seems to me that 
whatever plausibility that attaches to various 'causal theories' of philosophical 
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topics, such as the causal theories of  perception, perceptual objects, objects 
of emotion, naming and reference, inferential belief, knowing, etc. will 
quickly vanish if causation is understood nonrealistically, as a mere pro- 
jection of  some internal epistemological state with no corresponding objective 
basis. Finally, the split between causal idealism and realism obviously ties 
in with the larger division between idealism and realism in general. Although 
causal idealism appears to be logically consistent with general realism con- 
ceming knowledge and reality, it is also clear that there is a high degree of  
affinity and congruence between causal realism and global realism, and also 
between causal idealism and global idealism. Our discourse, both scientific 
and ordinary, appears to be thoroughly imbued with causal concepts, as 
witness the prevalence of  causative verbs such as 'kill' and 'break', and the 
marriage between causal idealism and general realism is likely to result in a 
rather strange and unattractive picture of  the world. 
It seems to me that the twin issue of  causal relativism vs. absolutism and of  
causal idealism vs. realism are of  central importance and interest in assessing 
the explanatory approach to the analysis of  causation. It is the standpoint 
one takes on these issues, rather than the degree of  success or failure in 
formulating a detailed account or constructing counterexamples, that will 
shape one's overall view of  the nature of  causality and its role in our know- 
ledge of  the world, a~ 
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